Emerging Powers and Mass Atrocity Prevention – China

This paper was drafted by Kim Nackers on behalf of The Nexus Fund
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Introduction

China is currently a key player on mass atrocity prevention (MAP)\(^1\), and will continue to be so commensurate with its increasing global power. China has the second largest economy and largest population in the world, and wields considerable political power, both regionally and globally. It maintains a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council and is an active contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. It is also a member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Furthermore, the Chinese government has shown a commitment to multilateralism through the UN and through seeking alternative arrangements, such as the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization.\(^2\)

In the coming decades, China is likely to have considerable sway over global MAP policy and normative direction. Beijing has trade and diplomatic relations with a number of conflict-affected states, and when Chinese diplomats choose to exercise their leverage over these states on MAP issues, the results can be impressive.\(^3\) China is also affiliated with other rising powers, in particular, the BRICS grouping, of which China is the largest.\(^4\) Together, the BRICS economies amounted to $13.2 trillion in 2011, with a trajectory set to increase. This groupings’ influence on policy is increasingly apparent, but should not be overstated. Although the BRICS often have a joint interest in constraining the West, their divergent national interests prevent them from acting consistently as a diplomatic bloc.\(^5\)

China has always been a significant power in Asia. Its considerable influence stems from its status as the economic epicentre of the region and its sizable military capacity. This economic and military strength translates into diplomatic leverage that can be used to advance peace and security in the region.\(^6\) China is also becoming increasingly involved in Central Asia, particularly as it develops Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the hope of insulating Xinjiang, China, from the fallout of instability in Afghanistan.

Increasingly, China has considerable influence in Africa as well, primarily through trade and investment, which have become crucial to the development of China due to its need for natural

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\(^1\)For the purposes of this paper the term ‘mass atrocity prevention’ (MAP) means a broad set of activities that help contribute to averting and halting mass atrocities.

\(^2\)The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a regional organization based in Eurasia, which was established as a security organization. The organization has become involved in matters related to conflict prevention. For example, they assisted the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and other regional organizations in facilitating assistance and dialogue between relevant parties in Kyrgyzstan, in response to the outbreak of violence in June 2010.

\(^3\)For example, certain Chinese diplomatic efforts with Sudan influenced the conflict in Darfur and the peace process with South Sudan in a favourable direction. However China also often chooses not to exercise that leverage or, indeed, to shield states that are facing international pressure on human rights.

\(^4\)The BRICS states are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

\(^5\)For example, India and Brazil have cooperated with the West against China when their interests are at stake, such as in discussions over the RMB (Renminbi) exchange rate. In an October 2012 UN Security Council vote calling for access by aid groups to affected populations in Syria, as well as other measures short of the use of force, China and Russia opposed the resolution and India, Brazil and South Africa abstained.

\(^6\)For example, China has been very active in conflict-inflicted Myanmar. Although China successfully blocked a 2008 UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar following the refusal of Myanmar’s government to accept humanitarian assistance to populations affected by Cyclone Nargis, the Chinese government was instrumental in obtaining a visa for UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and ensuring he was able to meet with top officials in Myanmar. More recently, Chinese negotiations proved crucial in preventing a crisis between the government and ethnic groups from escalating, and groups from within Myanmar are increasingly seeking out Chinese and regional assistance over the West.
resources. China has overtaken the United States as Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trading partner, and accounted for 18% of trade in Africa in 2011. This has led to strategic partnerships, not only with regards to trade and investment, but also on a host of social and security initiatives, including education, science, and cultural and military affairs.

China has developed considerable influence with its African trading partners on issues related to security. For example, China was seen as instrumental in securing Khartoum’s consent to the deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur in 2006. Finally, China is evolving and adapting on issues of peace and conflict. The experience of having its sovereignty compromised from the mid-19th to mid-20th century by Britain continues to inform its foreign policy, with the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty being seen as safeguards against imperialism. However, according to an NGO expert working on Chinese policy, younger generations of Chinese leadership may be more pragmatic and open to the need for China to revisit how it interprets its traditional approach as its global stature increases.

**Position on Mass Atrocity Prevention**

**China’s Recent History of Mass Atrocities**

China’s history is important in understanding its approach to MAP. Its semi-colonial past, marked by what is regarded as a ‘century of humiliation’ from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, has had a significant impact on how Chinese officials and leaders think about foreign intervention. Mass atrocities perpetrated by Japanese forces in Nanjing in 1938 are still an emotive issue in China with significant political attention.

The Chinese Communist Party, the leading force behind China’s governance for the past six decades, has a violent history of crackdowns, purges and political movements that have resulted in a massive death toll. However, this history, particularly with respect to atrocities perpetrated by the Communist government, is politically sensitive and Chinese officials are careful not to draw any connection between China’s own bloody 20th century and the issue of mass atrocity prevention in general.

**Position on the Responsibility to Protect**

As the largest emerging power in the international system, China’s position on international norms has increasing weight in determining normative outcomes. Historically, China has maintained a principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states. This has translated into a reluctance to engage with the debate over intervention to protect civilians. However there is some evidence that China’s views on sovereignty are subtly shifting. This is in part the result of China’s increasing involvement with international organizations that its rising global status brings. This has developed into what China expert Sarah Teitt describes as acquiescence in the normative underpinnings of the responsibility to protect (R2P), while simultaneously limiting “the prospect of R2P directly undermining its resistance to non-consensual intervention, or to utterly discredit its commitment to enhancing civilian protection through political negotiations rather than enforcement measures.”

Although China argues that humanitarian interventions are not embedded within the UN Charter and are therefore an illegitimate use of force, China ultimately supported the adoption of R2P at the 2005 World Summit. The Chinese government has, however, been careful to specify that the World

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7 The major mass atrocities include those that were committed by Japan in 1937, particularly in Nanjing, during the Chinese Civil War from 1927-1949, and by the Chinese Communist government against domestic populations in Tibet in 1959, as well as by the Communist government during the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1975 – the death toll of the cultural revolution remains unknown but estimates range from 500,000 to 3 million people. Smaller scale suppression of domestic populations has occurred as well.
Summit outcome is a cautious commitment to addressing mass atrocities through the UN Security Council, which must not be expanded or abused.

When interventions are necessary, Chinese academic Liu Tiewa describes four points that must, from a Chinese perspective, be met,

“Firstly, the Chinese government highly stresses the prudence in determining when it is suitable to carry out the intervention action, which should be done on the case by case basis; secondly, [the] Chinese government also emphasizes the peaceful means of humanitarian intervention. Thirdly, the humanitarian intervention action should be taken under the existing UN framework; and the forth (sic) is to respect the opinions of the target state’s people and the regional organizations. ”

One way that the Chinese government may attempt to negotiate these issues is through the concept of “creative involvement,” articulated by the prominent Chinese academic at Beijing University, Wang Yizhou. Creative involvement holds that China has much to gain by increasing its involvement in international affairs,

“China should use cautious, creative and constructive mediation when dealing with international issues. By sticking to and promoting our ideas such as new concepts on development and security and the vision of a harmonious world, which are based on Oriental civilization and Chinese wisdom of moderation and tolerance, China can properly deal with its relations with other nations, improve its image as a responsible power and have greater say in international affairs.”

Wang claims that creative involvement must maintain three principles: it should obey the UN Charter; it should be based on the invitation of the local people, or by the majority of the political parties in the country in question; and it should be conducted in line with regional preferences. Furthermore, Wang argues that China’s interests and capacities and whether it has the resources and ability to influence the affairs of other states must be taken into account. Finally, all peaceful measures must be acted upon, and military force must be primarily a method of deterrence.

China has also focused on regional organisations as the gatekeepers of legitimacy to international actions. China has often blocked measures in the UN Security Council that go against the wishes of the host state, yet, in Libya, China was willing to permit the enforcement of a No-Fly Zone after the Arab League requested the measure. Furthermore, China has offered significant support to developing the preventative capacity of regional organisations, particularly in Africa. For example, China publicly stated support in the UN Security Council and UN Peacebuilding Commission for the operationalization of the African Union’s early warning and peacekeeping capacity. However, China has ignored the Arab League’s position on the crisis in Syria, suggesting that there are some limits to and inconsistency in its support for regional organisations.

Nonetheless, the third pillar of R2P involving the international community taking measures in a timely and decisive manner including through using coercive measures remains controversial, and China has been reluctant to support international interventions. NATO’s implementation of the No-Fly Zone in Libya compounded Chinese fears that R2P may be misused by more powerful states in the international system to overthrow regimes it dislikes. This fear is heightened by the lack of formalised standards built into R2P to determine what constitutes ‘manifest failure’ and when a crisis might trigger and international intervention. The concept of the “Responsibility while Protecting,” developed by Brazil, is seen as potentially filling a gap on these issues.

Position on Past Crises: Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Darfur and Libya

Chinese policy, which emphasises the need to obtain consent from host states prior to involvement in preventing or responding to mass atrocities has seen subtle shifts. This is evident in crises in Rwanda,
Bosnia, Darfur and Libya. On the Rwandan crisis of 1994, China (and other states) did not characterise the events as genocide, instead framing it as a “civil war”, and stated that negotiations were the only way to resolve the crisis. China however voted, along with a unanimous UN Security Council, to establish the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993. China abstained on resolution 929, which authorised the deployment of a French-led force. They cited the lack of consent among the parties for the deployment and the need to expand UNAMIR as opposed to deploying a French-led force.

China supported UN Security Council resolutions on Bosnia that were undertaken with the consent of the government and opposed those that did not have consent. As the humanitarian crisis became increasingly dire, China’s position softened somewhat, yet the Chinese were careful to argue this was because Bosnia was an exceptional case. As Ambassador Chen Jian stated during a UN Security Council vote to establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “I should like to reiterate for the record that its expected adoption and my delegation’s participation in it do not prejudge China’s position on future Security Council actions on the subject.” China voted for the resolution to deploy a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VI, which had the consent of the Yugoslavian government. China abstained on key resolutions, such as 770 and 776, which expanded the UN peacekeeper’s mandate and provided protection for humanitarian purposes, citing its disagreement with the use of force and the need to obtain host state consent. However, as the humanitarian situation deteriorated and reports of ethnic cleansing began, Chinese representatives voted for several measures expanding the UN mandate.

On the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, China was sympathetic to the Serbian state, which China believed was defending itself against an internal insurgency. China was the most vocal opponent to the UN Security Council’s involvement in Kosovo. China rejected external intervention on the basis that human rights protection was not a legitimate ground for contravening state sovereignty. China further suggested that mandating NATO to intervene would set a precedent for UN-sanctioned intervention, which led China to oppose the labelling of the crisis as a threat to international peace and security.

Although China was often obstructive to UN Security Council measures during the crisis in Darfur, it was also able to use its influence with Khartoum to obtain consent from the Sudanese government for certain UN-led initiatives. China abstained from voting on a number of resolutions, citing concerns that Sudan’s sovereignty would be undermined by measures taken without the consent of Khartoum. Furthermore, it consistently threatened to veto resolutions, which resulted in weakened resolutions. China’s foreign policy argues that this apparent softening of China’s absolutist stance with regards to the protection of sovereignty was driven by more traditional national interests. Gaddafi’s actions created significant instability, forcing China to undertake a massive rescue mission of approximately 36,000 Chinese citizens from Libya, as well as to contend with approximately US $18.8 billion in financial losses as a result of in-country investments by the Ministry of Commerce, according to the Chinese official press agency Xinhua News. Moreover, China repeatedly cited the

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8 For example, the arms embargo was restricted to Darfur instead of the whole of Sudan due to China’s insistence.  
9 A Chinese legal scholar with experience on issues related to China’s foreign policy making interviewed for this report has also supported this claim.
need for the international community to respect Libyan sovereignty and stressed the use of diplomatic measures to resolve the crisis, particularly through the AU’s efforts.

Another factor potentially relevant to the assessment of China’s actions on Libya is that the language that established the No-Fly Zone in resolution 1973 was vague and open ended. According to a Chinese legal scholar with a deep knowledge of foreign policy making in Beijing, this lack of clarity allowed Chinese officials to support the resolution without locking themselves into a clear position on military intervention more broadly. However, another expert noted that this may not be an accurate interpretation due to China’s insistence that all mandates on the protection of civilians include the phrase “necessary measures to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence” within deployment areas. China was critical of NATO’s aggressive interpretation of the mandate, which the U.S. administration argued was comprehensive enough to include their actions.

The outcome of the crisis in Libya has influenced China’s position on Syria. In the aftermath of the Libya intervention, government officials in Beijing suggested that Chinese UN representatives in New York had misled them. Initially, China’s disapproval of the way the air campaign in Libya was implemented led it to oppose even modest measures to address the crisis in Syria. However, China has since become more active in proposing measures to address the crisis in Syria, as its opposition to UN action was tainting its relationship with Saudi Arabia and other energy suppliers in the region, as well as grouping it with extremist anti-Western states such as Cuba and Iran.10

Action taken on Mass Atrocities

China has, on occasion, been active in facilitating diplomatic channels in order to bring parties responsible for violations of the protection of civilians to reach an agreement to spare further conflict, notably between Juba and the Sudanese government and between rebel factions and the government of Myanmar. China has also become supportive of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). While China initially resisted the ATT, citing the need to reduce poverty and focus on economic development to prevent conflict, this focus has more recently been amended in favour of arms control. An NGO expert suggests that this is at least partially due to the effects of arms proliferation on China’s interests in Africa, as this trade negatively affects the stability of states that China engages with, and threatens the security of Chinese citizens living in these states. However, this support is also likely due to pressure from African, European and US governments. Furthermore, China has yet to sign or ratify the ATT, and it continues to export arms to states that use weapons to commit atrocities against their own populations.11

Perhaps the most significant area in which China has shown engagement on issues related to mass atrocities is with regards to Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions. China used to be wary of participating in UN peacekeeping missions, however this attitude has shifted significantly over time. China has become the fifteenth largest troop contributing country in the world, and the largest troop contributor of the permanent five UN Security Council members. The first generation of Chinese peacekeepers consisted of non-combatant personnel, such as engineers or de-miners. However, second generation peacekeeping has had more frontline involvement and there is the expectation that Chinese peacekeepers will experience combat. Chinese policy has become more flexible on the use of force in peacekeeping missions to protect civilians, in spite of the continued insistence on host state consent. For example, China has recently committed to send over 500 soldiers, including some combat troops, to the UN force in Mali to secure the country and support the state. This move is noteworthy as it is the first time China has committed combat troops to a UN peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, it is the largest contribution China has made to a UN

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10 China has proposed two separate peace plans for Syria, the first on 6 March 2012, the second on 1 November 2012. Both plans have been criticized for being vague and failing to provide details.

11 This occurred in both Sri Lanka and Darfur.
peacekeeping mission to date, and the deployment itself is high-risk due to the volatile nature of the conflict. This willingness to put Chinese troops in harm’s way represents a positive shift, perhaps indicating that China sees such heightened engagement as necessary for a country with global power status.

Decision-Making Process and Key Organisations Working on MAP

Decision-making processes on MAP-related issues are unclear to many observers due to the guarded nature of the Chinese bureaucracy. The Communist Party of China (CPC) Politburo with its seven member Standing Committee is the primary foreign policy decision maker. The politburo includes the Foreign Affairs Work Leading Group and State Security Leading Group, which are comprised of Standing Committee members and other leading CPC officials. These groups make major foreign policy decisions and set overall policy. However, while individual members of the Standing Committee have their distinct portfolios, there is no one member with a specific foreign policy portfolio, leaving foreign policy decision making open to all members of the committee. Other primary actors in foreign policy decision making include the CPC International Department, which engages overseas, and the PLA, particularly the General Staff Department. The PLA and the Ministry of State Security (MSS) are involved where there is a security issue or the potential involvement of military force. Decision-making on individual cases may also go to the State Councillor within the State Council for exceptionally acute or political crises. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) implements policy and focuses on the management of relationships with other countries. The MFA is able to set policy in line with overarching Chinese foreign policy goals in smaller states that are not crucial to China’s interests. However, it has no policy-making power of its own and even the highest MFA officials are not authorised to make decisions, only provide recommendations. The CPC sends delegations to countries with which it has serious interest in engaging.

While the MFA should be the principle agency implementing foreign policy, it is sometimes described as a weak organisation that has been sidelined by other parts of the state bureaucracy when national interests, such as economic growth, are at odds with diplomatic objectives. Furthermore, there is evidence of an internal divide within the MFA, which has departments with overlapping agendas and mandates. The MFA is also constrained by hard-line domestic politics, with nationalist party members arguing the ministry too often compromises Chines national interests.  

There are a number of other governmental bodies and state-owned companies with interests in conflict-affected countries, which may also influence policy making. Many of these actors focus on domestic issues and do not have the same concerns or capabilities to address issues related to international relations and diplomacy. Provincial governments can send trade and economic delegations to other countries. In one specific instance, local authorities inside China have taken action that implicates Chinese foreign affairs without input from Beijing, forcing the Chinese central government to send staff from Beijing to bring the situation back under its control.

Foreign Policy Orientation that Influences Political Action and Decision Making on MAP

China bases its foreign policy on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which were developed by the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, and made public in 1954 during his visits to India and Myanmar. These are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful

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coexistence. The five principles are intended to preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of China while securing peace between China and other states. It is thought that this stability will create an environment in which China may develop and modernize. Furthermore, after emerging as victor of a tumultuous civil war, China’s Communist Party came to affiliate its raison d’être with the maintenance of China’s unity and territorial integrity. From this position, China is reluctant to support measures that might infringe on the sovereignty of other states. Furthermore, China maintains a top-down view of stability, in which stability is closely tied to a strong state. This is reflected in the difficulties in discussing issues related to R2P following the intervention in Libya, which has made MAP a sensitive topic, as many now associate R2P with only the use of force.

In spite of these inhibiting factors, there are some situations in which China is taking a more engaged position in order to support its economic interests. This is particularly apparent in Africa, with some Chinese companies now taking more interest in socially responsible activities following the rejection of Chinese companies in some areas because of their poor understanding of local issues.

The Chinese government engages in these issues largely on a bilateral basis. Thus, humanitarian assistance is processed through governments as opposed to humanitarian aid organizations. However, China is increasingly finding that there are drawbacks to dealing solely with other governments, which often lack the capacity to adequately address domestic problems. Another drawback to this approach is that Chinese policymakers are left without the local knowledge required to make accurate risk assessments in relation to Chinese assets, particularly across Africa.

At the moment, there is not an official position on mass atrocity prevention or response, and these issues are addressed in an ad hoc manner. When crises have occurred, Beijing has tended to rely on the direction of relevant regional organizations to shape its policy position, although this does not necessarily hold in situations where Chinese interests are directly involved.

**Domestic Issues that Influence Political Action and Decision Making**

China maintains areas of ‘core interest’, which include Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, where sections of the population are not supportive of Chinese rule or the actions of the Chinese government. China is willing to threaten and in some cases use force in these regions in order to maintain its authority, and is thus reluctant to criticise other states for using force to keep their own populations under control or to allow secessionism to become an international norm. The Chinese government is also concerned about dissent from its own citizens, particularly in light of the Arab Spring.

In 2012 and 2013, China underwent a change in leadership, which saw Xi Jinping succeeding Hu Jintao as General Secretary, Li Keqiang taking over as Premier from Wen Jiabao and Wang Yi assuming leadership of the MFA from Yang Jiechi, who is now in the more influential position of State Councillor. Though the Party will unlikely announce any radical departures from traditional foreign policy principles, it may in practice allow for the testing – especially in Africa – of a more flexible interpretation of non-interference that will give it greater maneuverability to protect national interests, such as the safety of Chinese citizens or the preservation of partner regimes. Nonetheless, domestic stability remains the overriding priority for Beijing in the face of popular political upheavals overseas and perceived containment by the United States. As such, it is equally likely to strongly push back against any further dilution of international norms related to the primacy of state sovereignty,

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14 For example, in 2011, the Chinese government provided 1,440 metric tons of wheat, 500 metric tons of rice, as well as cooking oil and flour to drought and famine victims in the Horn of Africa.

15 Core Interest is a term that Chinese policy makers use to describe “sovereignty related issues” that are key to maintaining China’s authority over its territory. See Kleine-Albrant, Stephanie T. ‘Does Promoting “Core Interests” Do China More Harm Than Good?’ *China File*, May 2 2013. Available at http://www.chinafile.com/does-promoting-core-interests-do-china-more-harm-good.
even going as far as to take the lead and build coalitions of developing country solidarity on this issue. Furthermore, although the new leadership has restated its focus on China’s core interests, there is evidence of some subtle shifts. In the 18th Party Congress Report, concerns about neo-interventionism are voiced, yet the report notably opposes foreign subversion of legitimate governments of other countries. According to China expert at the Carnegie Institute, Michael Swaine, the word ‘legitimate’ gives Chinese policymakers room to maneuver where necessary. The report also focuses on non-traditional security initiatives and the interests of Chinese citizens living overseas, suggesting a potential shift in policy to reflect emerging security concerns with the new administration. However, these trends should not be overstated, as it is likely that changes in policy will be gradual and not necessarily progressive.

Influence of Civil Society on the Government

Think tanks, particularly those directly affiliated with the state, are called upon at times to provide information to the government, which gives these think tanks some influence. This dissemination of information is a murky process, however, and many researchers are unaware of the impact their research has on policy making. Still, there is reason to believe that as a result of the government’s knowledge-gaps in relation to conflict-affected areas where the Chinese state has economic interests, think tanks and academics are becoming an increasingly important part of the policy process.

However, there are severe limitations on civil society more broadly, as the government controls the media and restricts the activities of civil society. Thus, human rights advocacy in a more comprehensive sense, especially on foreign policy issues, is largely absent in China and civil society organisations are largely relegated to a monitoring role. These dynamics may change as an increasing number of Chinese NGOs working overseas, including organisations that focus on humanitarianism and development, such as the Chinese Red Cross and China-Africa Brightness Action, may further develop the Chinese government’s response to civil society. There is also an opportunity for international civil society organisations to work with nascent Chinese NGOs to develop their understanding of mass atrocity prevention.

Public Perceptions of Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response

The Chinese public is not generally engaged in or concerned about MAP. Both the media and civil society organisations are monitored and censored by the government, making their public statements reflective of government policies on these issues, and limiting the public’s access to dissenting viewpoints. This in turn informs local understandings of MAP. However, this may change as it becomes more difficult for the Chinese government to control information with the increasing availability of information via technology.

Against this backdrop, the Chinese public appears to be surprisingly supportive of the idea that the UN has the responsibility to stop mass atrocities – at least according to a 2006 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion. Findings from the survey conclude that the Chinese public strongly backs the idea that the UN Security Council can and should authorize intervention to stop severe human rights violations. More than three-quarters of the Chinese polled (76%) said the UN has the responsibility to protect people from abuses such as genocide even “against the will of their own government.” Additionally, nearly three-quarters (72%) believe the council should have “the right to authorize the use of military force” to prevent such violations.

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16 Swaine, Michael D. 2013. ‘The 18th Party Congress and Foreign Policy: The Dog that Did Not Bark?’, *China Leadership Monitor* 40: 4-5. This observation is mirrored in the views of an anonymous Chinese academic with expertise in Chinese foreign policy making.

17 For more details on these dynamics, see Summers, Tim. ‘China’s New Leadership: Approaches to International Affairs’. *Chatham House Briefing Paper*, April 2013.
Conclusion

While China is a key state to consider when examining issues related to mass atrocity prevention and response, it is also a difficult state to engage with on these issues. It is largely rhetorically supportive of measures related to MAP, yet it is extremely cautious with regards to measures that might compromise sovereignty or territorial integrity. However, Chinese policies in these areas are evolving. Generally, China is more supportive of international action on mass atrocity prevention and response where relevant regional organisations are supportive of such action, suggesting that regional organisations are gatekeepers for Chinese policymakers to support these measures. Finally, China is becoming more open to limited engagement where the stability of a country is in question, especially if its economic interests are involved.